The Manavgat Water Supply Project has been developed by the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) and financed by the General Directorate of Public Finance under the auspices of the Undersecretary of the Treasury. The project was planned to supply municipal water to the settlement and resort areas along the Mediter¬ranean shore during dry periods, and/or to export water to other countries short of water (Kaya, 2005). Successfully accomplished in 2000, the project supplies 250 000 m3 of raw and 250 000 m3 of treated water, a total of 500 000 m3 of water per day (Kaya, 2005).
Water is lifted from an intake structure downstream of Manavgat hydroelectric power plant to the treatment plant and storage tank at an elevation of 70 m. Treated and raw water is conveyed to the two single point mooring (SPM) loading terminals, which are like petrol filling stations. The terminals are designed to allow the loading of 250 000 dwt (dead weight ton) capacity tankers. Since the total capacity of Manavgat river is 4. 7 BCM/yr, there are two reservoirs on it to regulate the water and the total capacity of the Manavgat project is 0.
18 BCM/yr, already there is a surplus of water for export from the Manavgat river (Demirel & Kulege, 2004). Depending on the operation of the program and the demand in the developing market, more units may be added to the project to export more water. The transportation of water may be by conventional methods, shipping and pipeline, and by a novel technology of Medusa (Canada) and Spragg (USA) plastic bags which will be towed by a tug.
Operation of the water supply facilities and marketing of water may be undertaken by a Turkish enterprise or by an agency with shareholdings. The project may serve all customers who wish to buy the water. Potential buyers may be the tourist areas around Manavgat, Northern Cyprus, the nearby Greek islands, Israel, Libya and some other Arabic countries. If the demand is higher, the project can be enlarged and new units can be added, since more water is available as already explained. Water in Turkey: International Politics and National Security.
Turkey’s use of water and its development plans – usually exclusively domestic concerns – have become important issues in the country’s foreign policy. The reason is that some of Turkey’s key water resources are also claimed in part by Syria and Iraq. The Euphrates river is 1,675 miles long, 40 percent inside Turkey, and the Tigris is 1,180 miles long, 20 percent inside Turkey. One of the most contentious issues in Turkish-Syrian relations, along with security and territorial disputes, has been the sharing and quality of water in the EuphratesTigris basin.
This question, however, is affected by changing circumstances. Turkey’s transformation of GAP (the Southeastern Anatolia Project) from a largely hydroelectric project to an integrated regional development program starting in the mid-1980s exacerbated the anxiety of both midstream and downstream countries and escalated the tensions between the two countries (Kut, 1993). Turkey claimed that Syria was giving logistical support to Kurdish separatists to induce Turkey to make concessions on the water issue.
Consequently, Turkey’s domestic concerns shaped around regional development, energy needs, and resolution of ethnic tensions in eastern and southeastern Anatolia are intrinsically part of the ongoing water dispute among the three riparian states. Water issues are also essential in Turkey’s overall relations with its Western allies, its role in the Middle East peace process, and its economic and geostrategic role in the world (Gruen, 1992). Except for the Nile, the Euphrates-Tigris system is the only river system offering an economically exploitable water surplus in the Middle East.
The dispute over water rights has a long history since the river cannot accommodate all the demands for water for hydroelectric, irrigation, drinking, or regional development purposes. There is also much controversy about the water requirements of neighboring states, both over methods of calculation and whether there has been political manipulation of these data. Land classification systems of Iraq and Syria differ widely from that of Turkey, which makes for disagreements about the amounts of agriculturally usable land (Kolars, 1994).
A purely economic analysis would propose a technical solution based on each country’s long-term agricultural and industrial needs and propose techniques for more efficient agriculture and water use (Bakour, 1992). Once again, however, economic claims are made and needs are defined through political processes. Given both strategic preferences and internal pressures from farmers, each country insists on being self-sufficient in food regardless of cost or efficiency questions. Mistrust among the countries also heightens demands for as much water and food production as possible.
The Turkish side questions whether lands included in Syrian and Iraqi calculations are really irrigable. Turkey wants a tripartite, systematic assessment of all parties’ water needs for irrigation based on land resources and economically practical irrigation methods. Ankara suggests that an equitable, rational and optimum utilization of water can be achieved through a scientific study which will determine the true water needs of each riparian country. Iraq and Syria have both largely perceived this proposal, however, as infringing on their domestic affairs.
Syria and Iraq base their demands on projected water needs. Not all the planned irrigation, however, has materialized. For instance, Syria has planned the Tabqa Dam to irrigate 1. 6 million acres of land but has so far irrigated only about 590,000 acres mainly due to salinization and poor quality of land. Nevertheless, both countries regard Turkey’s emphasis on optimal use of water as a strategy to divert attention from the issue of “water rights. ” Syria and Iraq see GAP as a project to assert Turkey’s claims over both rivers and control the water flow so as to ensure dominance over them.
Hence, relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have been particularly strained since the opening of the Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River, GAP’s main installation, in 1991. Before the dam, the water was mainly used for generating hyrdoelectric power in homes and industry. But the dam marks a shift toward employing 80 percent of the water for irrigation purposes. This shift brought protests from Syria and Iraq. The three sides have not even been able to agree on defining the river system.
While Turkey sees the Euphrates-Tigris system as a “transboundary water system, ” Syria and Iraq call it “international water. ” While Turkey claims sovereign rights over the Euphrates and Tigris on the basis of being the upstream country, Syria and Iraq argue that all riparian states should have equal rights over international waters. Turkey says that since most of the waters are generated within its territory, it has priority on use. Turkey also argues that the two rivers should be seen as a single water system since they join before reaching the Persian Gulf.
Iraq and Syria, however, object to this interpretation, arguing instead that each river should be discussed separately and that the rights of the downstream states cannot be limited by the sovereignty claims of the upstream countries. Iraq has insisted on “acquired rights” based on “ancestral irrigation” from centuries ago. Ironically, although Syria also raised this idea, it opposed a similar argument made by Iraq in claiming some of Syria’s water. What constitutes an “equitable” and “reasonable” distribution of water is at the heart of the dispute.
Documents such as the 1911 Madrid Declaration and Salzburg decision by the International Law Institute followed by the 1956, 1958, 1960, and 1966 declarations by the International Law Association, and finally the 1978, 1989, 1991, and 1994 reports by the UN International Law Commission are key references for international law on water rights. The 1994 draft report prepared by the International Law Commission, which later was approved as the framework convention by the UN General Assembly on May 21, 1997, also aimed to establish some norms and principles that the signatories would agree to and obey.
Out of 133 countries that voted on the final resolution, 103 voted in favor, 3 voted against (Turkey, China, and Burundi), and 27 abstained. Not surprisingly, those that abstained or voted against were among the most important countries involved in water disputes, which suggests that reaching a comprehensive international agreement on transboundary waters will prove very difficult. Part of the reason is the uniqueness of each water dispute, which makes it harder to agree on general principles.
Nevertheless, some principles on sharing international waters, such as “equitable and reasonable utilization and participation, ” as well as an obligation not to cause “appreciable harm” to downstream states, have been proposed as general parameters by the International Law Commission. However, the law defines as “equitable and reasonable” distribution or “appreciable” harm, parties will still interpret the law according to their own interests.
The initial 1994 draft resolution on the Convention on NonNavigational Uses of Transboundary Watercourses, for instance, was interpreted very differently by Turkey, on one hand, and Iraq and Syria, on the other. Turkey has seen this resolution as backing the rights and claims of upstream states, but Syria and Iraq mainly consider this document as an endorsement of equal rights over the transboundary waters.
Turkey’s rejection of the General Assembly resolution of May 1997, for example, was mainly because the document requires prior approval for water projects by the riparian states, potentially subjecting Turkish development projects to a Syrian and Iraqi veto (Frey, 1993:23). Despite disagreements with Syria and Iraq, Turkey did not face much opposition from those countries until the late 1980s, because earlier hydroelectric development of the rivers benefited the downstream states by regulating the flow of the river. So long as Turkey’s projects were confined to addressing its energy needs, the downstream states’ protests remained limited.
Another reason for the relatively mild opposition was the serious water dispute between Syria and Iraq themselves. As Turkey shifted emphasis from hydroelectric use to integrated regional development in late 1980s, however, it began to face serious opposition from both Syria and Iraq. The first sign of the increasing difficulty began with the funding of GAP. Syria and Iraq (along with Saudi Arabia) succeeded in persuading the World Bank not to finance GAP until Turkey worked out a riparian treaty. Nevertheless, Turkey benefited from other geopolitical tensions in the region.
Two issues had earlier led Iraq to ignore the water problem. First was the Iran-Iraq War and increased dependence of Iraq on Turkey. Syria’s decision to close its Iraqi border in 1982 and its shutting down the Iraqi oil pipelines made Turkey the only oil outlet for Iraq. Second, Iraq sought Turkey’s cooperation in controlling Kurdish separatism. The two sides signed a security protocol in 1984 where they agreed to each’s right to pursue subversive groups in the territory of the other up to a distance of 3 miles, and Turkey made effective use of this protocol throughout the late 1980s.
In contrast to Iraq, Syria used the Kurdish problem in southeastern Anatolia as a major bargaining tool over water, especially since it lacked other types of bargaining power: as early as 1983, Turkey had publicly complained about Syria’s support of anti-Turkish Kurdish groups (Bolukbasi, 1993:15). Later, Turkey regularly accused Syria of harboring and training PKK activists and sheltering their leader Abdullah Ocalan.
In the 1987 Turco-Syrian protocols, Turkey agreed to guarantee a minimum annual flow of 650 cubic yards per second to Syria from the Euphrates until a final agreement could be reached among the riparian states. Most analysts argue that Turkey signed this agreement and offered other carrots to Syria to ensure its cooperation on border security (Bolukbasi, 1993). In a parallel agreement, Syria pledged to end its support for the PKK and other anti-Turkish groups. But Turkey’s concessions did not solve the problem; Syria continued to harbor the PKK and help its activities.