The question of whether the new genetics is a cloaked form of modern eugenics is an interesting and complex one. In considering both these methods, it is important give each a proper definition become further claims are made concerning their relationship to each other. New genetics is based on the extensive research into genes and DNA that has been conducted throughout the past decades. This knowledge is utilized in new genetics as a means of detecting the presence of genes that have a high potential of creating congenital illnesses in foetuses, which in turn are likely to remain with them for the rest of their lives.
This form of “therapy” seeks to eliminate the foetus in the embryonic stages and therefore prevent the births of persons who are likely to be inexorably ill, unhappy, or otherwise unable to function in society. Eugenics has been considered by many to be a social ideology wrapped in the cloak of scientific theory. It concerns the consideration of a particular group of persons within society (usually a race) as being more desirable than other races and therefore more worthy of being granted the right to reproduce.
Eugenic ideologies have been responsible for efforts at ethnic cleansing, but have also been involved in movements that regard disabled persons as being undesirable. In the famous case of eugenic activity in Nazi Germany, Hitler’s attitude toward the Jews often overshadows a similar consideration of inferiority conferred on those who were disabled. Efforts made at removing undesirables from the population also included the widespread killing of disabled people.
In light of this historical and scientific circumscription of the two ideas of eugenics and the new genetics, it would appear that they do have a lot in common. The fact that so many similarities exist between the two ideas does leave room for argument that new genetics (in its determinism) does in fact to some degree another form of eugenics (Hughes, 1996). However, the fact that the two ideas are not identical means that on some level, new genetics does differ from eugenics, and the consideration of whether or not one feels they are both equally undesirable practices rests on the nature of this difference.
Therefore, a discussion of the similarities and differences will ensue and judgments made in each case as to whether new genetics might be considered as merely another form of eugenics. In earlier times when eugenics was first proposed and was being widely debated and even practised, the goal of this movement was to improve the stock of humanity. These persons were primarily social and political thinkers, and the intent of these proponents of eugenics was to produce a human race devoid of all weakness—one that would propel hominids into a faster and more desirable evolutionary form (UKDPC, 2000).
On the other hand, new geneticists are primarily scientists and medical professionals whose intent in proposing this practice is to eliminate the possibility of congenital disease wherever this may be possible. Therefore, one major difference between the two movements lies in the idea of superiority versus compassion. While the proponents of eugenics were ready to rid society of a group of persons for the sake of gaining a supposedly superior race, new geneticists look at the problems of illness and disability from the standpoint of the disabled and tries to eliminate their pain.
Therefore, in that light, new genetics does seem different from and more honourable than eugenics. Another are in which the two forms differ is in the methods chosen to put their theories into practice. While the principles of new genetics are in large part based on choice, the eugenics principles are grounded in the idea of the “survival of the fittest” (Spencer, 1851). The new genetics principles propose to grant the parents of foetuses the liberty to make the decision concerning whether or not their child should be brought into the world with the disability.
However, in the deterministic view of the eugenics ideology, parents and foetuses are subject to elimination (Hughes, 1996). The parents are eliminated by death or the foetuses are eliminated when their chances of birth are made null through the sterilisation of their prospective parents. Those who dissent to the practice of new genetics on the grounds that it is similar to eugenics argue about the lack of choice given to the foetus in both those cases. In eugenics, the foetus has no voice but is effectively and finally silences through methods of sterilisation imposed upon their parents (UKDPC, 2000).
In new genetics, the foetuses are similarly silenced through the efforts of their parents to ensure the birth of only non-disabled children (2000). However, it might also be considered that the consideration of how the foetus’ life might end up is a part of the decision process in new genetics, and the most effective and practicable method of choice is indeed employed in this movement. The parents, who are the closest relatives of the foetus, are allowed to make this decision, and this might be compared to cases in which non-communicative persons who are very ill are treated by hospitals in manners determined by their next of kin.
Furthermore, since such parents are likely to have had (or to have known) someone with the same illness, the new genetics method represents the most informed type of decision that is possible, barring the ability of the foetus to make that choice for him/herself. In addition to these considerations, the ideas behind new genetics have to be examined as a method of determining whether its premise (that disabilities are undesirable) has any basis in reality (UKDPC, 2000). Eugenics operates on the principle that certain races are qualitatively different in the way they experience life and in the benefits that they can offer humanity.
This idea has been effectively discredited today. However, the idea of whether this is true of disabled persons is pertinent to the discussion. The extent to which disabilities are disliked by disabled persons must also be considered, especially since new genetics does deny the right of life to the person (foetus) it considers as having a high chance of being born with a disability. While the experience of disabled persons is subjective, ideas can be gained about the extent to which they value their lives from empirical evidence.
Certain groups of hearing impaired persons have been known to form groups and consider themselves as being not disabled at all, but merely different. It has also been heard of that certain people, disabled from birth and offered the chance to remove that disability, have refused this and opted to continue living with it (Joyner, 2004). These situations challenge the idea that disabled persons would rather not exist than live on earth with disabilities. While this is an unstated premise of the new genetics movement, it does derive directly from its ideas.
The movement to rid a foetus of its chances of having life out of compassion for it presupposes that the foetus would rather not be born than to have to live with a disability (Hughes, 1996). This has clearly not been the case in certain instances, and the attempt to make the choice for an unborn human may actually represent a sort of presumption on the part of new geneticists that resembles the presumption of eugenicists. Eugenics and new genetics share roots in genetics and also share some methods of implementing their plans.
Despite this, the two differ in important areas that have the effect of making one a more desirable form of intervention than the other. While eugenics represents mainly a social ideology, new genetics represents a form of medical intervention that has the potential to serve a variety of ideologies. Eugenics represents the sum of ideas that many have considered racist and blindly supremacist. New genetics, on the other hand, represents a scientific method that some have considered equal to other forms of medical intervention available for the disabled.
In this light, and in light of the fact that the intents of those who propose each are usually different, the two ideas cannot be considered equal. However, the question of whether both are to be judged equally from a moral standpoint depends on subjective ideas known only to the disabled, and which are not likely to be fully understood by the public.
References Hughes, J. “Embracing change with all four arms: post-humanist defence of genetic engineering. ” Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics.
6: 94-101. Joyner, H. (2004). From Pity to Pride: Growing Up Deaf in the Old South. Washington: Gallaudet UP. Spencer, H. (1851). Social Statics or the conditions essential to happiness specified, and the first of them developed. London: John Chapman. UKDPC. (2000). “The new genetics and disabled people. ” The International Sub-committee of Disabled People. United Kingdom Disabled People’s Council. Retrieved on December 7, 2007 from http://www. bcodp. org. uk/about/genetics. shtml