HIV/AIDS no doubt is one of the most researched and written upon socio-medical issues today. But least attention has been paid towards other socio-political implications of this global pandemic. One of these neglected areas of concern is the global security threat posed by HIV. This article briefly discusses this dimension by taking into account the causes and effects and thereby recommends the suggestive measures. Implications for the military forces and demographic compulsions have been discussed. More light needs to be thrown on the issue but this article is an attempt to initiate the discussion.
It is no overstatement that AIDS is “…the greatest disease challenge that humanity has faced in modern history. ”[1] More people will die from the disease than any other disease outbreaks in human history, including the global influenza epidemic of 1918-19 and the Bubonic Plague in the 1300s. Over 22 million worldwide have already been killed and it is projected that, at current rates, another 200 million more will be infected just by 2011. [2] National security is traditionally defined as the protection of a state’s territory, population, and interests against external threats.
While recognizing the humanitarian dimensions of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, national security analysis rely on the human impacts of the disease to be large enough to affect the military, political, and economic interests of a state. Following are the main arguments linking HIV/ AIDS and security in national and international contexts: 1. The primary connection between AIDS and security appears to come from the unique linkage between the disease and the institution of the military. Continual studies find that the average infection rates of soldiers are significantly higher than equivalent age groups in the regular civilian population.
During periods of war, this figure often soars to as much as 50 times higher. The impact that high HIV prevalence will have on the strategic capabilities of militaries is complex. ?The loss of highly trained, professional soldiers to AIDS will have a major impact on affected armed forces. ?Trained soldiers are difficult and expensive to replace, and their absence interrupts the training of younger recruits. ?Armed forces that rely wholly or partially on conscripts face a decreasing pool of healthy recruits as HIV/AIDS continues to spread.?
For example, Russia’s HIV epidemic is already exacerbating an existing shortage of healthy individuals available for military service. ?It is also argued that armed forces with high HIV prevalence may incur mounting costs to treat soldiers with antiretroviral drugs, leading the military to seek greater proportions of public expenditure while rendering them less able to protect national and international interests [3] 2. Concern about peacekeepers spreading HIV/AIDS while on missions brought the pandemic to the attention of the UNSC in 2000.
In addition to peacekeepers directly spreading HIV, high rates of HIV among the militaries in troop-contributing countries may make it more difficult to staff peacekeeping missions [3]. High rates of HIV in the South African and Nigerian militaries in particular, which are major contributors of peacekeeping troops, may imperil African-led responses to regional crises such as that in Sudan. Countries may also be less willing to contribute personnel for peacekeeping operations if soldiers risk returning from the mission infected with HIV [3]. 3.
Consequently, one of the many implications stemming from high AIDS prevalence in the military is that forces will likely be less able and less willing to participate in peacekeeping operations. In fact, around 40% of present UN peacekeepers come from countries nearing high infection rates and potential ensuing collapse. [4] As the disease’s force is ultimately felt internally, these militaries will be less likely to participate in voluntary, but demanding, activities such UN peacekeeping which would negatively affect the global security patterns. 4.
The effect of HIV/AIDS on state stability is perhaps the least studied, yet also the most feared, potential impact of the disease on security. The US National Intelligence Council argues that high rates of HIV/ AIDS are “likely to have significant economic, social, political, and military implications” in certain countries [5]. If these implications become severe, the AIDS epidemic could contribute to state instability. The security danger of failed states extends beyond the simple human tragedy that is then played out in the ensuring chaos and collapse.
While stable states outside the region might imagine themselves secure and able to stand aside from failed states, the realities of the global system no longer permit this. 5. The threats of economic and/or political collapse from the disease can also lead to new refugee flows. Besides facilitating the spread of the disease, time and time again, sudden and massive population movements prompted by these factors have led to heightened regional-wide tensions and destabilization.
With the likely increase to pandemic levels on their doorsteps in the Caribbean and the former Soviet Union, American and European fears of past refugee crises (such as the 1990s Balkans wars and Haitian collapse) could be revisited. Conclusion and Suggestions: What is clear is that arguments linking HIV/AIDS to national security have succeeded in elevating the disease to the highest levels of international politics, resulting in greater political commitment and funding.
Nonetheless, it is also important to recognize that there are a number of potential risks in adopting a national security approach to fight HIV/AIDS. In countries like Russia, India, and China, the security implications of HIV/AIDS involve vulnerable populations such as injection drug users, sex workers, and ethnic minorities in separatist areas. Addressing their health needs using a security-based rationale could lead to repression or increased stigmatization of persons living with HIV/AIDS, both counterproductive to effective public health practice.
Finally, the security community seeking to win “hearts and minds” through health initiatives clouds the traditionally humanitarian role of public health and could lead to a loss of trust in the motives of public health professionals working on HIV/AIDS, an issue already fraught with sensitivities. The Soviet KGB disinformation campaign, suggesting that the US deliberately developed and spread HIV/AIDS, is an early example of the mixing of HIV/AIDS and security politics that still haunts public health activities today [6].
Successfully negotiating these risks is critical to ensuring that the public health–national security nexus benefits the fight against HIV/AIDS. •Strengthening the evidence base on the links between HIV/AIDS and national security is essential. This includes better data on the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS among soldiers and peacekeepers, and the complex relationship between the disease and state stability. •Finally, a new understanding of the disease-security nexus is required and, in particular, should be used to rework old modes of military thinking.
•Intelligence agencies must update their threat projection models to incorporate the disease, which shall guide the policy formulation and response mechanisms. •Military aid programs must also be similarly reassessed. For example, if states seriously cared about the capabilities and readiness of their allied forces, they would integrate AIDS prevention programs into military assistance packages, with positive spinoffs for the populace as a whole. The $10 million, two-year pilot program run out of the US Navy Health Research Center provides a potential model.
The program is tasked with assisting a small number of African militaries in establishing AIDS prevention programs. [7] •Other military aid programs to explore include incorporating AIDS into traditional training and education exchanges (such as the US-run IMET) as well as multilateral military AIDS efforts, with interested states cooperating through forces that already have an extensive military health presence in high infection areas, such as the French have in Africa. In sum, AIDS is a daunting threat, but not an unassailable foe. It is a disease that is still preventable.
Conceptualizing AIDS as a security threat, thus, is not just another exercise in expounding on the dangers of the disease. It clarifies the hazards as extending well beyond the realm of health and into that of violence and war. Consequently, it strengthens the call for serious action against the menace of AIDS. It is not just a matter of altruism, but simple cold self-interest. Kshitij Bansal is a student of Law at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Patiala, India. Email Address: kshitijbansal23@yahoo. com.
REFERENCES: 1. Harvard University Professor Jeff Sachs, quoted in Simon Baynham, “African Military Capabilities in a Changing Security Environment,” Paper prepared for “the African Military in the New Millennium: Capabilities and Challenges,” Conference, Washington, DC, June 28, 2001. 2. International Crisis Group (ICG), HIV/AIDS as a Security Threat, ICG Report, June 19, 2001. www. intl-crisis-group. org. 3. Elbe S (2003).
Strategic implications of HIV/ AIDS. Oxford University Press Oxford: 78. 4. “Infected Troops Spread Scourge Worse than War,” 2001; ICG, 2001, p. 23. 5. National Intelligence Council (2000) National intelligence estimate: The global infectious disease threat and its implications for the United States.
Environ Change Secur Proj Rep 6: 33–65. 6. Helen Epstein, “AIDS: The Lesson of Uganda,” The New York Review of Books, July 5, 2001. http://www. nybooks. com/articles/14309. 7. Gerry Gilmore, “Navy Targets AIDS in African Militaries,” American Forces Information Services, April 26, 2001. Douglas Farah, “Pentagon Role in Africa May End;
Training Program Put Under Review,” Washington Post, July 3, 2001. The recipient states, chosen on the basis of prior US military ties, are Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria and Zambia. Angola was also included, as a means to opening bilateral military relations.