The argument that abortion can be procured in special cases begs an analysis of the understanding of the personhood of the unborn even if they are deformed. Assuming that it is ethical to grant abortion rights in cases where the foetus is diagnosed with various mental retardation and development abnormalities, then the act can only be ethically valid if the foetus is not a person. However, if the foetus has attained personhood, then the argument justifies the killing of handicapped children. In the context of morality, there is no distinction between the execution of handicapped children and the abortion of handicapped foetuses(Rae 2000).
Thus, if the society decrees that it is unethical to execute handicapped children simply because they are mentally or physically deformed, then the same stance should apply to the termination of pregnancies of foetuses that are deformed. The argument of whether a deformed foetus be carried to term or not should not be restricted to the status of the foetus but on their personhood. If it is accepted that the foetus is a person, then the ethicality of abortion in genetic deformity cases flops. Alternatively, the ethicality of abortion in such cases only holds if the foetus is not a person.
This is because if it is accepted that the foetus is a person, then it is unsurprising that killing of handicapped children is unacceptable in any society. The reason is simple; they are persons. Traditional medicine prohibits medical practitioners from killing their patients either for the benefit of the patient or that of other people. Since the foetus have achieved the status of personhood, it is selective abortions are unethical. The practice can neither be supported by its preventive nor therapeutic purposes.
By killing the foetus simply because it has been diagnosed with an incurable disease and that the prototype representations predicts pain and suffering in life, selective abortions can only be supported if they are used as a form of euthanasia. Even as euthanasia, it still violates the rights to life and the protection of handicapped and vulnerable members of the society who are unable to give consent. It is a presumption to posit that a handicapped life is completely not worth living and as such, deformed foetuses should be aborted.
While it may be true that there exit extreme cases of mental deformities such as anencephaly where abortion may be deemed ethical, these cases are very rare. The ethical considerations applicable in such extreme conditions can not be applied to moderate deformities like Down’s syndrome. Moreover, there exists no conclusive evidence that unhappiness definitely accompanies disability(Rae 2000). Couples desire to give their children the best in life, under a situation where the unborn has been diagnosed with Down syndrome, they begin to believe that that could not be the best start in life for their child.
This understanding of happiness forms the basis of the belief that life with such an abnormality is worthless and a source of suffering and therefore abortion is ethical and morally right(Rasko et al 2006). Such an understanding should not warrant the termination of life since it is no different from a scenario where a mother aborts simply because she has no extra room for the child she is carrying. It is a fact that children born with Down’s syndrome have intellectual disabilities and a greater majority of them never assume an independent life later on, but their lives can also be joyful just like that of other children(Singer 1993).
Several studies have shown that with proper counselling, families with a member who had Down’s syndrome can adapt well to the situation and lead happy and fulfilling lives. The quality of life in these families is not in any way varied from those families without Down’s syndrome. Thus, the quality of life and the societal burden argument do not justify the termination of pregnancies diagnosed with Down’s syndrome(Louhiala 2004). It has also been established that in some instances individuals with congenital disabilities attain the same level of satisfaction in life as their non-disabled counterparts.
It is important to reiterate that even though the extent of severity is often indeterminable prenatally, the prototypical case of a person with Down’s syndrome is usually descriptive of those individuals in profound suffering and pain. With regard to the suffering of parents, these individuals are presented as those that are a drain to the parents and the society. In reality, 75%-90% of all individuals who were diagnosed with the condition as children have the capacity to live independently and many are employable as adults.
Only less than 5% of all the cases depict the prototypical description circulated in medical circles. It is this small percentage that is severely to profoundly mentally retarded (Alkeny 2002). These percentages refute the prototypical representations that are used to support the fact that it is ethical to abort in cases of foetal abnormalities. It is entirely true that a small proportion of families may feel overwhelmed by the disease progressions of their child, but in a majority of the cases, the symptoms of Down’s syndrome are generally mild and most children usually relate well with other people.
These children take pleasure in their physical surroundings, their toys, their families and their playmates. To them happiness comes easy and even if they grow up to adulthood, they maintain that childlike good humour. Never are these individuals burdened with adolescence nor adult cares. Their life is simple and less complex, their feelings are less intense. Just like everyone else, they become angry, irritable, sad or happy but their emotions do not persist as in the case of the non-disabled.
Even though they are slow to learn and respond to their environment, the encouragement and affection they receive from their families and friends make them lead a happy and fulfilling life(Hatl and Jones 2008). It is unethical to vanquish the existence of such individuals on the basis of their disabilities. IV. Final Resolution Even though the paper makes clarifications, distinctions and oppositions that drive the ethical considerations for or against abortion in selective cases like Down’s syndrome, the valid concerns that drive the medical practice of prenatal testing and the consequent selective abortions are not included in the analysis.
However, as concerns the objective of medicine to alleviate human suffering, the use of prenatal testing and selective abortion in preventing future suffering from mental abnormalities are but the achievements of the initial objectives. When focus is laid on the prevention of suffering per se we perpetuate a personal tragedy model and ignore or dismiss the personal accounts of individuals with disabilities. In a way, the granting of abortion rights in such selective cases works towards the goal of eliminating the rights of people with disability to exist.
This is morally and ethically unacceptable. Abortion should only be taken as an intervention in specific cases which undoubtedly and fully lead to a life of complete suffering and pain. Mild conditions like Down’s syndrome do not qualify in this specification. Such specific tragedy models will regulate the supreme focus of preventing the birth of children with disabilities; stop the equation of disability and suffering and lay the foundation for the treatment of these abnormalities in future and existing persons as opposed to promoting the elimination of future persons with disabilities.
Thus, with regard to ethical analysis, selective abortion is unethical.
References
Ankeny, R. A. (2002). Mutating concepts, evolving disciplines: genetics, medicine, and society. Springer; 208-221 Butts, J. , & Rich, K. (2005). Nursing ethics: across the curriculum and into practice. Jones & Bartlett Publishers; 90-91 Hartl, D. L. , & Jones, E. W. (2008). Genetics: Analysis of Genes and Genomes. Jones & Bartlett Publishers; 266